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Cultural Capital: Arts 
Graduates, Spatial Inequality, 
and London’s Impact on 
Cultural Labor Markets
Kate Oakley1, Daniel Laurison2, Dave O’Brien3,  
and Sam Friedman4
Abstract
This article looks at the degree to which spatial inequalities reinforce other forms of 
social inequality in cultural labor markets. It does so using the example of London, an 
acknowledged hub for the creative and cultural industries. Using pooled data from 
2013 to 2015 quarters of the United Kingdom’s. Labour Force Survey, we consider 
the social makeup of London’s cultural labor force, and reveal the extent to which, 
rather than acting as an “engine room” of social mobility, London’s dominance in fact 
reenforces social class disparities in cultural employment.
Keywords
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Introduction
The figure of the artist has a strong hold on the urban imagination. Whether starving 
in garrets, kick-starting gentrification or inventing the next trend, movement or scene, 
the artist is invested with huge symbolic agency when it comes to influencing the 
image of cities (Hall, 1998). At the same time, artists are often described as being 
“drawn” to cities, the implication being that there is no choice for the ambitious or 
even the curious, but to go to the big city and try to make it. In the British imagination, 
London has played such a role at least since the middle ages (Fielding, 1992). A city 
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whose fortunes have long been decoupled from that of its host nation, London is the 
financial, political, educational, and cultural capital of the United Kingdom. It repre-
sents a degree of centralization which has, wisely, not been replicated by most other 
countries.
This article looks at the role of London in reproducing a particular form of both 
social and spatial inequality in cultural labor markets. Its starting point is the discourse 
of the “creative city,” within public policy, the argument that urban areas would retain 
their historic advantages in cultural production, even as digitalization made dispersed 
production a possibility (Mould, 2015). For many policy makers, this opened up 
opportunities for cities in the Global North suffering the effects of deindustrialization 
and has thus been embraced as an economic development strategy from Detroit to 
Derby. Also central to this strategy was the idea that the cultural and creative industries 
(CCIs) represented a labor market which was meritocratic, and which opened up 
opportunities to women, those from Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic (BAME) back-
grounds, and working-class people, who had been not only disadvantaged in other 
professional labor markets but particularly hard hit by the form of neoliberal economic 
growth (Oakley, 2014). These assumptions have proved to be ill-founded, as even 
advocates of this position, such as economic geographer Richard Florida (2017), have 
recently admitted. Culture labor markets, far from opening up opportunities, in fact 
tend to be dominated by White men from relatively privileged backgrounds (Friedman, 
O’Brien, & Laurison, 2016).
This article considers this relationship between place and other forms of inequality, 
particularly as it applies to global cities like London. Specifically, the article looks at 
how the cultural dominance of world cities like London operates at the level of the 
labor market, and the way in which, by clustering particular sorts of cultural activities, 
it reinforces other socioeconomic, for example, gender, ethnicity, and particularly 
class-based, divides. It also considers the role of higher education and particularly arts 
education within this phenomenon. London is not simply home to high-level cultural 
employment but to some of the United Kingdom’s more elite art colleges (Banks & 
Oakley, 2016). Does higher education, as is sometimes the case within other profes-
sional labor markets, have an “equalizing” or mitigating effect on these inequalities? 
How does the relatively weak link between credentialization and professional cultural 
practice play into this? And what are the challenges from this analysis for arts educa-
tors at a time of rising inequality?
The first section of the article sketches out the relevant literatures and the policy 
discourses of which they are a part. The CCIs have become central to the economies 
of many countries (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2015) but 
they are also used to make other normative claims of meaning, identity, even equity 
(Oakley & O’Brien, 2015). The second part of the article challenges some of those 
claims, using data on industry composition, class origin, and the “London effect.” Our 
analysis provides an important frame for discussions of the role of arts graduates in 
society. The analysis demonstrates that an important policy story—the link between 
arts education and the CCIs (Ashton & Noonan, 2013)—is not supported by data on 
this section of the labor force. Moreover, by reading this data from a spatial 
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perspective, a crucial element in how CCIs cluster together (Markusen & Gadwa, 
2010; Zukin, 1998), we show the need for more attention to be given to the nexus 
between arts education, place, and the creative economy. If, as we demonstrate, arts 
education cannot mitigate the broader inequalities of class, race, gender, and place 
underpinning the creative economy, then it is vital for new lines of defense to be found 
in discourses of the role of arts in society.
Literature Review
London: The Creative City as an Idea and as Policy
We begin with the importance of London as a site for intersecting inequalities in the 
United Kingdom’s approach to the creative city. The evidence suggests that most CCIs 
are biased to the urban; that is CCIs are more likely to be found within cities (Hall, 
1998; Zukin, 1998). There are a variety of reasons for this. The tendency for cultural 
workers to colocate is driven by the opportunity of employment in urban networks, 
alongside the need for cultural producers to swap ideas and contacts, socialize together, 
and trade industry gossip (Currid, 2007; Lloyd, 2006). Communicating these ideas is 
best done face-to-face, even in activities such as videogames production that make 
much use of digital technology. Indeed research suggests that the higher up the value 
chain—and the closer to the creative elements of production—the more likely it is that 
face-to-face interaction will be important.
At the same time, these urban networks of cultural production have an interdepen-
dence with cultural consumption. Opportunities for cultural consumption are gener-
ally greater in cities than elsewhere, and the link between production and consumption 
in these places is strong, often manifest in “scenes” associated with particular sites 
(Crossley, 2015). Indeed, while specific cultural occupations, for example, artists, are 
present across national and regional geographies (Markusen, 2013), they tend to clus-
ter in one or a handful of core cultural centers (Menger, 1999).
For firms in the CCIs, and for the associated leisure sectors from bars and clubs to 
coffee shops and independent retail, being located in certain areas can be invested with 
what is sometimes referred to as “symbolic capital” (Lloyd, 2006; Zukin, 1998). The 
growth in importance of creative city policies and the ideology of urban competive-
ness means that cities have, in recent decades, sought to “operationalize” creative 
activities and the associated symbolic capital to produce economic results. There has 
been a rise in “active state” policies from the expansion of higher education, including 
arts, design, and media subjects, to public investments in workspaces, studios and 
incubators, publicly funded networks, and intermediaries and tax incentives devised to 
lure firms, particularly in the media sectors, from one urban location to another 
(O’Connor & Gu, 2013).
Efforts to capitalize on CCI as an urban growth strategy have not been without 
some success. In the United Kingdom, jobs in the CCIs have continued to grow and 
according to the United Kingdom’s Department for Culture, Media, and Sport 
(DCMS), they made up just over 5% of the U.K. economy in 2016, accounting for 
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some 1.9 million jobs. Between 2013 and 2014, these sectors grew by 8.9% as opposed 
to 4.6% for the economy overall (DCMS, 2016). Recent data (Mateos-Garcia & 
Bakhshi, 2016) suggests that more than 90% of local economies in the United Kingdom 
have seen increases in cultural sector activity, but, crucially, regional differences 
remain and have deepened. The counterpart to the tendency of cultural activities to 
cluster together is that they seem to cluster more effectively in some cities than in oth-
ers (Scott, 2000). Other towns and cities attract web designers and some back-office 
software production, but, in the United Kingdom, little troubles London’s long-stand-
ing cultural and economic dominance. Together with the Southeast region that sur-
rounds it, London accounts for half of all cultural sector employment in the United 
Kingdom, has 40% of the United Kingdom’s cultural workers, and a third of all its 
businesses in that sector (Mateos-Garcia & Bakhshi, 2016). There is thus a clear geo-
graphic imbalance associated with cultural work in the United Kingdom. Indeed, this 
is reflected not just in cultural production, but in cultural consumption and associated 
state funding. The concentration of “national” cultural institutions helps ensure that 
public arts funding is more than 10 times greater per capita in London than the rest of 
England (Stark, Gordon, & Powell, 2013). Concurrently, debates and campaigns asso-
ciated with arts education (e.g., Arts Emergency, 2017) have asserted a relationship 
between inequality in cultural jobs and arts courses in higher education. London is 
especially important to this story as a result of its dominance with U.K. cultural pro-
duction networks and its status as host to key arts schools, drama schools, and other 
creative education facilities.
In the policy imagination, far from reinforcing inequality, London has long been 
seen as the “engine room” of social mobility, an “escalator region” where the talented 
and hardworking are most readily able to get ahead in the education system and labor 
market (Fielding, 1992; Greaves, Macmillan, & Sibieta, 2014; Social Mobility 
Commission, 2016). Yet this view has recently been strongly challenged. Cunningham 
and Savage (2015, p. 321) argue that contemporary London is not so much an escala-
tor region but an “elite metropolitan vortex”—“a space where the coming together of 
intense economic, social and cultural resources enable the crystallization of a particu-
lar elite social class formation” with “an increasing propensity toward self-recruit-
ment.” This argument has been further substantiated by Friedman, Laurisn and 
McMillan (2017) who uncover a marked “class pay gap” in London’s higher profes-
sional and managerial sector. These authors find that those in these occupations work-
ing in the capital from working-class backgrounds earn, on average, £10,660 less per 
year than those whose parents were in higher professional and managerial employ-
ment. The inequality that separates London from the rest of the United Kingdom is 
mirrored, spectacularly, within the city itself. London is home to some of the United 
Kingdom’s poorest citizens, while such is the concentration of the global super-rich 
that even many of its middle-class residents feel squeezed out of its housing market 
(Atkinson, Burrows, & Rhodes, 2016). The wealth of the best-off 10% living within 
London is over 100 times greater than that of the poorest 10%.
Yet while one might expect that traditional professions such as law and medicine 
are dominated by the privileged—many, including in the policy community, would be 
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surprised to learn that the same is true of the CCIs. The promotion of cultural industry 
strategies in economic development discourse has long suggested that not only is this 
sector open to talent from anywhere but that such diversity is part of their life blood 
(Arts Council England, 2015). Indeed, the current minister for culture in the United 
Kingdom has declared that the arts “are one of the greatest forces for openness and 
social mobility” (Hancock, 2016).
Inequalities in Cultural Labor Markets
The type of policy rhetoric associated with diversity and social mobility has gone hand 
in hand with questions of representation and inequality in cultural production. These 
questions have, in turn, been matched by the growth in academic work on cultural 
labor in general (Banks, 2017). What has long been apparent to scholars in the field 
(see Oakley & O’Brien, 2015, for a summary of this work)—that the CCI workforce 
is less ethnically diverse, more male, and skewed toward those of a higher socioeco-
nomic background than most other sectors of the economy—is being increasingly 
recognized by the media, policy makers, and a wider commentariat, prodded in part by 
media coverage and by policy interventions such as the ones noted in the previous 
section.
O’Brien, Laurison, Friedman, and Miles (2016) have demonstrated the range of 
social exclusions in CCI occupations. For example, the exclusion of those from less 
affluent social origins: 43% of people working in publishing, 28% in music, and 26% 
in design come from privileged backgrounds, compared with 14% of the population 
coming from this same social origin. At the same time, fewer than 7% of employees in 
many CCI occupations were from Black or minority ethnic origins, an underrepresen-
tation compared with the rest of the population as a whole and a major underrepresen-
tation compared with the Black and minority ethnic origin population of London. 
There were also underrepresentations of women in key cultural sectors such as film, 
TV, radio, photography, IT, and architecture. Other data suggest a loss of women from 
these industries, even where the numbers entering are similar. A survey of the media 
sectors (film, TV, radio, and photography) reveals that women aged 35 years or more 
are particularly underrepresented, compared with both men of the same age and 
women aged less than 35 years (Creative Skillset, 2014).
Our focus within this article is primarily on class-based inequalities, and how these 
inequalities complicate the narrative of the creative city. Until very recently, this area 
has received less attention than other aspects of inequality, in part because of the dif-
ficulty of providing data on class. This is because unlike other “protected characteris-
tics” such as age, ethnicity, disability, gender, and sexual orientation, there is no 
requirement on public agencies to collect data in terms of social class. Moreover, the 
historical narratives of class and creative work common to policy makers such as 
Hancock (2016) occupy an important position in distorting class as a category in cul-
tural labor research. As Banks (2017) has commented, there was of course no “golden 
age,” in terms of equality, class based, or otherwise in the CCIs. The “opening up” of 
cultural employment in the 1960s and 1970s, often symbolized by working and 
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low-middle class success stories from the Beatles to David Hockney, coincided with a 
general expansion of White-collar employment in much of the Global North and a 
growth in postsecondary and higher education. Yet while this created a greater sense 
of opportunity, there is little evidence that working-class people did better vis-à-vis the 
middle class. There was simply “more room at the top” (Goldthorpe, Catriona, & 
Clive, 1980). What the narratives of CCIs during this period did however—via a 
“Swinging London” myth revived at the turn of the millennium—was to cement the 
idea of the CCIs as open, meritocratic, even classless. Thus, the intersection of creative 
city, class inequality, and the economic imaginary of creative labor (Campbell, 2014) 
require critical scrutiny.
The Role of Arts Education
One of the starting points for this critical scrutiny is education. One of the ways in 
which opportunities in cultural work were said to have opened up was via Britain’s 
postwar expansion of higher education, and its diversification into polytechnics and 
colleges. For most of the 20th century, many smaller U.K. towns and cities had their 
own independent art school, predominantly serving local working- and low-middle 
class populations at a time when only a few universities offered fine art degrees and 
tended to recruit their students from more privileged social groups (Frith & Horne, 
1987). The art school thus came widely to be known as an accessible alternative to 
university, offering the “masses” the viable prospect of practically oriented craft and 
aesthetic education.
This hypothesis—of higher education as the “great equalizer”—has some prece-
dent in the literature on social stratification (Bernardi & Ballarino, 2016). For exam-
ple, in a seminal paper, Hout (1988) found no association between social origin and 
occupational outcomes among people with a university education in the United States. 
A similar effect was also reported more recently in Sweden (Breen & Jonsson, 2007). 
Education, on this reading, served to combat class-based discriminations, albeit only 
for those able to gain entry in the first place.
Yet there is a crucial difference between the CCIs and other sectors of the economy, 
which is the relative unimportance of formal educational qualifications. Although 
research on arts school graduates in particular suggests that they do try to pursue 
careers within the arts (Oakley, Pratt, & Sperry, 2008), the relatively small number of 
such graduates, the importance attributed to “learning on the job,” and the possibilities 
for developing relevant skills outside of higher education (e.g., as a hobby or pastime) 
means that relevant higher education qualifications are simply less important in these 
sectors than in others (Comunian, Faggian, & Jewell, 2011). Employers in the CCIs 
themselves have often shown equivocation about the relevance of formal vocational 
education. Many employers have not been “trained” in the crafts they practice. They 
may have studied something else at college, are self-taught, or have failed in a variety 
of jobs and careers before they found their niche (Towse, 1996). Then, where they 
have specialized education programs in fields like film or music, aspirants must none-
theless “gift” their labor (often as unpaid interns) to build the skills and networks to be 
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considered for employment (Banks & Oakley, 2016; Frenette, 2013). This has pro-
duced a culture of skepticism among employers and reliance instead on demonstrated 
experience, or, on what might be called the “guru” method, whereby people’s creden-
tials are established by the quality of those they have worked with, rather than by paper 
qualifications.
Indeed, even those who have argued most eloquently for the importance of the arts 
school as a route into the CCIs (e.g., Banks & Oakley, 2016; Childress & Gerber, 
2015; Frith & Horne, 1987) have not done so on the grounds of credentialization, but 
of socialization. In the milieu of the art school in the 1970s and 1980s, the role of the 
institution was as much about commitment to a cultural practice and the creation of a 
“scene,” as it was about formalized, targeted, or vocational education. As Frith and 
Horne (1987) pointed out, it was college bars and student unions, equipment and stu-
dio space, combined with exposure to contemporary debates in politics and the arts, 
which acted as an incubator.
The period from the late 1980s onward have seen arts schools move away from this 
more informal, experiential, and institution-based type of learning toward greater cre-
dentialization, formal work-based learning and internships, and absorption into the 
University system. The art school in every U.K. city is disappearing and where it exists 
is likely to be part of a (high fee-charging) university. At the same time, and more 
disturbingly, in fields where credentialization is weak, a whole host of other social 
factors become more important. In the case of working in the CCIs, these include 
parental background, location, social networks, and cultural capital (Duffy, 2016; 
Friedman et al., 2016; Randle, Forson, & Calveley, 2015). The equalizing effect of 
education that was the basis for the optimistic narrative of cultural work as open and 
meritocratic is much problematic in the current context.
Data and Method
To understand the impact of London on the cultural workforce, and thus on the produc-
tion of Britain’s national culture, alongside the impact, or otherwise, of specific routes 
into this workforce, the article now turns to an analysis of the Office for National 
Statistics’ Labour Force Survey (LFS). The LFS represents the largest nationally rep-
resentative sample of employment in the United Kingdom, with around 100,000 
respondents surveyed annually. We draw on data pooled from nine quarterly LFS sur-
veys from July 2013 to September 2015, obtained under a special license agreement 
so that we could match individuals across quarters, and in order to access the detailed 
occupational codes (four-digit standard occupational classification [SOC] 2010) for 
their parent’s occupations. We first used the DCMS (2016) creative industries esti-
mates in order to assign occupations (based on four-digit SOC2010 codes) to the nine 
sectors of the CCIs (outlined in Table 1). To consider class composition, we then iden-
tified the respondents employed in these occupations who also responded to the social 
origin question in the July-September 2014 or 2015 survey. This question asks respon-
dents the occupation of the main earner parent when they were 14 years old. We then 
group respondents’ social origins into four groups based on the National Statistics 
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Socioeconomic Classification (NS-SEC)1 classes;2 those with parents in NS-SEC 1 
(higher professional and managerial occupations), in NS-SEC 2 (lower professional 
and managerial positions), NS-SEC 3, 4, or 5 (intermediate occupations or self-
employed), or NS-SEC 6-8 (semiroutine, routine occupations, or unemployed). We 
also removed all those younger than 23 years, in full-time education, or older than 69 
years, as the LFS collects data on those older than 69 years differently, since most 
people in this age group have moved into retirement. This leaves 2,677 respondents in 
CCI occupations, 1,514 of whom also have earnings information (1,293 with data on 
all covariates used in regression models).3 It is important to note that the LFS does not 
collect earnings information for respondents who are self-employed, which we recog-
nize is an important part of the cultural economy; thus, all reports of earnings below 
are only for those who are employees. The self-employed are included in our descrip-
tive statistics below, but we are unable to say anything here about the earnings situa-
tion for self-employed workers in the CCIs. We can see, then, the three areas for 
analysis of the current settlement in cultural and creative jibs: the impact of broad 
Table 1. Basic Characteristics of CCIs.
Percentage 
of Black and 
minority ethnic
Percentage of 
women
Average 
age
Average 
estimated annual 
earnings, £
Unweighted 
N
Advertising and 
marketing
6.8 45.6 41.5 44,123 633
Architecture 6.8 32.5 42.0 33,110 152
Crafts 6.0 22.3 46.1 22,092 167
Design: Product, 
graphic, and 
fashion
6.7 47.7 40.5 27,599 219
Film, TV, video, 
radio, and 
photography
4.2 28.4 41.7 39,458 207
IT, software, 
and computer 
services
13.5 14.3 41.0 44,465 787
Publishing 8.3 52.9 45.1 35,512 218
Museums, galleries, 
and libraries
2.7 64.8 47.3 24,337 74
Music, performing, 
and visual art
4.8 42.4 44.1 23,806 220
CCIs combined 8.3 33.4 40.9 40,736 2,677
Any other 
occupation
9.9 52.1 47.1 26,219 61,898
NS-SEC 1 and 2 8.6 47.6 43.0 36,093 15,888
Note. CCI = cultural and creative industry; NS-SEC = National Statistics Socioeconomic Classification. 
Authors’ calculations from pooled United Kingdom’s Labour Force Survey Quarterly Data, 2013-2015.
Oakley et al. 9
social inequalities associated with class; the impact of specific social inequalities asso-
ciated with geography, particularly the role of London; and the mitigating, or other-
wise, effects of education, in particular arts education.
The Social Composition of U.K. Cultural Employment
We begin our analysis with a descriptive portrait of the demographic makeup of cul-
tural employment in the United Kingdom. Table 1 shows the social composition of the 
CCIs in terms of ethnicity, gender, age, and earnings. It demonstrates what is now a 
familiar pattern that women, and to a lesser extent those from BAME backgrounds, are 
underrepresented in Britain’s CCIs compared with the rest of the population. This 
finding builds on existing work by O’Brien et al. (2016) that demonstrates similar pat-
terns in earlier LFS data, as well as the extensive literature (exemplified by Conor, 
Gill, & Taylor, 2015) on the gendered nature of exclusions within CCI occupations.
Table 1 also demonstrates demographic variations within the nine individual sec-
tors that make up the CCIs as defined by the U.K. government. These data are consis-
tent with inequality highlighted in previous research, with women particularly poorly 
represented in IT and BAME groups constituting less than 5% of those working in 
film, television, music, and museums (Banks, 2017; Oakley & O’Brien, 2015). It is 
also important to note the striking variations in earnings in different areas of cultural 
employment. Average earnings in areas such as IT and advertising, for example, are 
far above the national average, whereas those working in crafts, music, and museums 
report earnings significantly below the national average. This wide variation echoes 
long-standing critiques (e.g., Campbell, 2014) of the aggregation of very different 
forms of occupation into “creative” industries, in particular the differences in occupa-
tional structure between IT and the more “cultural” occupations associated with per-
formance and the arts.
Next, we turn to the class composition of the CCIs. A focus on the class origins of 
those employed in different sectors within the CCIs, as shown in Table 2 and Figure 1, 
points to two significant findings. First, it is notable that those from privileged back-
grounds—with parents employed in higher (NS-SEC 1) or lower (NS-SEC 2) profes-
sional and managerial occupations—form the majority in almost every part of the 
cultural sector. For example, those from elite origins (NS-SEC 1) make up 13.7% of 
the total U.K. labor force, but represent 30.2% of advertising and marketing; 22.5% of 
design; 25.8% of film, TV, video, radio, and photography; and 28.9% of music, per-
forming, and visual arts. Figure 1 demonstrates the same findings but displays the 
results in terms of how overrepresented or underrepresented people from certain class 
backgrounds are in CCI occupations compared with the United Kingdom as a whole.4 
This shows that those from higher managerial or professional backgrounds are more 
than two times more common in advertising and marketing, publishing, or music, 
performing, and visual arts, than in the population as a whole. Second, there is also 
significant variation by individual sector. Craft employment, for example, is largely 
made up of those from working or intermediate class backgrounds, whereas areas such 
as architecture and publishing are dominated by the privileged.
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Results
The London Effect and Inequality
While the data presented so far updates (and largely echoes) previous analyses of 
inequalities in the United Kingdom’s CCIs (O’Brien et al., 2016), in this article, we are 
especially interested in examining whether this inequality is patterned spatially in 
ways that reflect London’s dominance within the United Kingdom.
In Table 3, we therefore examine how the demographic makeup of cultural employ-
ment in London varies relative to the rest of the United Kingdom, both the urban and 
nonurban areas. The demographic differences are immediately obvious: cultural work-
ers in London have less gender skew and are more ethnically diverse and younger than 
those in the rest of the United Kingdom (though there is not much difference in age 
between those in London and those in other urban areas in the United Kingdom). It is 
also striking that those employed in London’s cultural sector tend to come from sig-
nificantly more privileged backgrounds. While over 60% of those working in the CCIs 
in London are from professional or managerial backgrounds, the figure elsewhere in 
the country is around 45%. Those in London also earn on average 19% more than 
elsewhere in the United Kingdom.5 This both reflects the higher cost of living in the 
capital but also indicates that such employment tends to be higher status and higher 
profile.6
Table 2. Class Origins.
NS-SEC 1 
parents, %
NS-SEC 2 
parents, %
NS-SEC 3-5 
parents, %
NS-SEC 6-8 
parents, %
Total, 
%
Advertising and marketing 30.2 22.6 26.4 20.8 100
Architecture 24.6 23.8 38.5 10.4 100
Crafts 10.8 11.5 46.2 32.3 100
Design: Product, graphic, and 
fashion design
22.5 20.3 38.9 18.9 100
Film, TV, video, radio, and 
photography
25.8 28.9 34.2 12.4 100
IT, software, and computer 
services
22.6 22.6 33.1 21.1 100
Publishing 37.1 26.3 25.4 12.6 100
Museums, galleries, and 
libraries
25.8 28.3 21.7 20.8 100
Music, performing, and visual 
arts
28.9 20.5 31.6 18.2 100
Any other occupation 13.2 14.6 36.5 35.8 100
NS-SEC 1 and 2 destinations 20.9 20.2 34.8 24.2 100
Total 13.7 14.9 36.3 35.0 100
Note. NS-SEC = National Statistics Socioeconomic Classification. Authors’ calculations from pooled 
United Kingdom’s Labour Force Survey Quarterly Data, 2013-2015. N for reach row same as in Table 1.
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While those from more modest social origins are underrepresented in London’s 
cultural labor force, it is also important to ask whether they face barriers to progression 
once within these jobs. Existing research on the professions in the United Kingdom 
(Laurison & Friedman, 2016) has demonstrated a clear “class pay gap” between those 
from affluent and those from more humble social origins. There is also evidence that 
such barriers to progression exist in some sectors of the CCIs, such as acting (Friedman 
et al., 2016). Next, we examine this issue more widely in the CCIs as a whole, explor-
ing how average earnings vary by social origin in London and elsewhere in the United 
Kingdom. Of course, earnings do not represent a definitive indicator of career progres-
sion, but in the absence of data on occupational position they represent the best avail-
able proxy and an important indicator of success in their own right. Table 4 shows two 
key findings. First, it demonstrates that those from lower social origins in the CCIs 
earn somewhat less on average in both London and the rest of the United Kingdom—a 
“class pay gap” across the aggregated CCI sector. Moreover, this class pay gap appears 
larger in London. Those from working-class backgrounds earn on average only 85% 
Figure 1. Overrepresentation and underrepresentation of class origins in each cultural and 
creative industry.
Note. CCI = cultural and creative industry; NS-SEC = National Statistics Socioeconomic Classification. 
Height of bars gives the overrepresentation or underrepresentation of each origin group in each CCI 
group. This is generated by dividing the percentage of people from an origin group in each CCI by 
the percentage of people in our target population as a whole from that origin; values over 1 indicate 
overrepresentation, and a value of exactly 1 would mean people from a given social origin are no more 
or less likely to be found in that occupational group than in the rest of the population; for example, it can 
be seen that people with NS-SEC 1 origins are over 2.5 times overrepresented in publishing.
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Table 4. Earnings in the Creative Sector by Class Origin, London Versus the Rest of the 
United Kingdom.
Estimated annual earnings of 
those from each origin in CCIs 
in London, £
Estimated annual earnings of 
those from each origin in CCIs, 
rest of United Kingdom, £
NS-SEC 1 parents 49485.88 39825.41
NS-SEC 2 parents 42806.39 38953.32
NS-SEC 3-5 parents 47627.14 40656.42
NS-SEC 6-8 parents 41983.91 35948.31
Total 46480.52 39098.01
N in analysis 269 1,245
Note. CCI = cultural and creative industry; NS-SEC = National Statistics Socioeconomic Classification. 
Authors’ calculations from pooled United Kingdom’s Labour Force Survey Quarterly Data, 2013-2015.
of what those from higher professional and managerial backgrounds earn in London, 
whereas elsewhere in the United Kingdom the same figure is 90%.
While this class pay gap is striking, it is important to note that a distribution of earn-
ings averages cannot tell us whether the upwardly mobile face a “class ceiling” or pay 
discrimination. After all there may be simple demographic explanations for this differ-
ence—the privileged could simply be older on average, which would explain these 
higher average earnings. Similarly, there may also be “meritocratic” explanations for 
Table 3. The Makeup of the CCIs in London and the Rest of the United Kingdom.
London
Rest of United Kingdom
 
Urban, not 
London
Not 
urban Total
NS-SEC 1 parents, % 34.8 22.6 24.9 23
NS-SEC 2 parents, % 25.4 21.9 22.1 22
NS-SEC 3-5 parents, % 27.1 34.2 32.7 34
NS-SEC 6-8 parents, % 12.7 21.3 20.3 21
BAME, % 17.0 7.5 1.5 6
Whites, % 83.0 92.5 98.6 94
Men, % 60.5 69.9 63.0 68
Women, % 39.5 30.1 37.0 32
Age (average) 40.3 41.6 46.2 42.8
Earnings (average), £ 46,481 37,674 44,107 39,089
Total, % 23 77
N 619 2,058
Note. CCI = cultural and creative industry; NS-SEC = National Statistics Socioeconomic Classification; 
BAME = Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic. Authors’ calculations from pooled United Kingdom’s Labour 
Force Survey Quarterly Data, 2013-2015.
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the pay gap difference. For example, of particular interest to the readers of this special 
issue may be the hypothesis that the privileged are simply more highly or specifically 
educated, and if we examine cultural workers who are all graduates, or more specific 
types of graduates such as arts, humanities, or social sciences, it may be that the pay 
gap disappears.
In order to interrogate this hypothesis and to disentangle other potential sources of 
class-origin income difference; in Table 5, we take the CCI class pay gap in the United 
Kingdom as a whole and show a series of nested linear regressions that control for 
other potential sources of income inequality. In the first column, we include controls 
for gender, ethnicity, country of birth, and age as well as for paid hours worked and the 
quarter in which the respondent gave earnings information.7 In the second, we add 
measures of education: the highest degree or qualification the respondent has achieved. 
The third column adds a dummy variable for whether a respondent lives in London;8 
in the final column, we add dummy variables for each of the individual sectors within 
the CCIs.
Significantly, Table 5 illustrates that the class pay gap in the United Kingdom CCIs 
is actually larger once we control for demographic variables. For example, those from 
working-class backgrounds who are otherwise similar in all the demographic ways we 
can measure, face a statistically significant pay gap of, on average, nearly £6,500 a 
year compared with those from higher professional and managerial backgrounds.
Table 5 also shows that this gap is somewhat ameliorated once we control for edu-
cation, but the difference remains both statistically and substantively significant: 
working-class-origin people have predicted earnings of nearly £4,900/year less than 
privileged-origin people in the CCIs even net of the effect of education. Education, 
then, certainly does not act as the “great equalizer” in the CCIs and the direct effect of 
social origin persists. It is also worth comparing this with other professional and mana-
gerial occupations in the United Kingdom, where research has shown that controlling 
for education reduces pay gaps from £7,600 to £4,400 (Friedman, Laurison, & 
Macmillan, 2017), or about 40%, while here we see a 25% decrease in the estimated 
pay gap.
Table 5 also adds further insight into the role of London, the engine for the growth, 
but seemingly also the inequality, of the CCIs. Table 3 has already demonstrated that 
those working in London’s CCIs tend to be from more privileged backgrounds, and 
earn more, but Table 5 demonstrates that even once we control for living in London, 
the class pay gap remains statistically significant. In other words, the class pay gap in 
the CCIs is not being driven by the fact that people from working-class backgrounds 
are less likely to enter London’s more lucrative CCI labor market.
Indeed, it is only once we control for the specific sectors of the CCIs that the 
class pay gap loses statistical significance. In other words—and as demonstrated in 
previous analysis (O’Brien et al., 2016)—the class pay gap is partly explained by 
the fact that the privileged are more likely to enter higher paying sectors such as 
advertising, IT, and TV and Film, while those from working class, or more humble 
social origins, are more likely to work in sectors such as Craft, which are associated 
with lower pay.
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Art Education, Credentials, and the Labor Market
Although cultural labor markets have above-average representation of those with 
undergraduate degrees (see Tables 6 and 7), there is no simple coupling of 
Table 5. Regressions of Pay in the CCIs.
Adding 
demographic 
controls
Adding 
education
Adding 
London
Adding 
specific CCI
Origin (vs. NS-SEC 1)
 NS-SEC 2 parents −1,709 −1,402 −1,092 −526
 NS-SEC 3-5 parents −2,985 −1,392 −595 411
 NS-SEC 6-8 parents −6,487** −4,894* −3,961* −3,288
Age (in years) 394*** 439*** 449*** 514***
Non-White (vs. White) −247 −1,124 −2,054 −2,528
Women (vs. Men) −9,546*** −9,685*** −10,087*** −9,549***
Country of birth (vs. England)
 Outside United Kingdom 1,135 1,237 75 −173
 Northern Ireland −7,892* −8,084** −7,512* −6,701*
 Scotland −5,838* −5,374* −4,884* −4,890*
 Wales 2,974 1,485 2,774 2,031
Paid hours worked 300*** 305*** 297*** 299***
Degree type (vs. no degree)
 Arts or architecture 443 7 3,119
 Any other degree 10,487*** 9,959*** 8,188***
Live in London (vs. other 
United Kingdom)
6,600** 7,039***
CCI (vs. IT, software, and computer services)
 Advertising and marketing 4,046
 Architecture −5,920*
 Crafts −20,166***
 Design: Product, graphic, 
and fashion design
−10,055***
 Film, TV, video, radio, and 
photography
−5,843
 Publishing −8,641***
 Museums, galleries, and 
libraries
−18,692***
 Music, performing, and 
visual arts
−10,069**
Constant 18,217*** 11,317** 10,171* 9,479*
N 1,293 1,293 1,293 1,293
R2 .095 .128 .136 .192
Note. CCI = cultural and creative industry; NS-SEC = National Statistics Socioeconomic Classification. 
Authors’ calculations from pooled United Kingdom’s Labour Force Survey Quarterly Data, 2013-2015. 
The quarter in which respondents reported earnings is included as a control in all models but coefficients 
are not shown here for space reasons. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<,001.
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Table 6. Destinations of Those With Arts Degrees.
Percentage of arts graduates 
in each destination
Advertising and marketing 2.5
Architecture 8.2
Crafts 1.0
Design: Product, graphic, and fashion design 5.7
Film, TV, video, radio, and photography 3.8
IT, software, and computer services 2.0
Publishing 0.8
Museums, galleries, and libraries 0.3
Music, performing, and visual arts 5.8
Any other occupation 69.9
Total 100
N 1,224
Note. Authors’ calculations from pooled United Kingdom’s Labour Force Survey Quarterly Data, 2013-
2015.
Table 7. Degrees and Arts Degrees in the CCIs.
Any degree, % Arts degree, %
Significant earnings 
return for an arts 
degree (vs. no degree)
Advertising and marketing 57.4 9.8 No
Architecture 84.0 90.5 No
Crafts 17.9 48.0 No
Design: Product, graphic, and 
fashion design
44.1 86.7 Yes
Film, TV, video, radio, and 
photography
51.4 48.3 No
IT, software, and computer 
services
58.2 6.3 No
Publishing 70.3 8.0 No
Museums, galleries, and libraries 79.1 8.3 No
Music, performing, and visual arts 54.3 68.4 No
Any other occupation 21.5 7.8 No
CCIs total 56.3 28.9 No
Total 23.0 10.0  
N 58,589  
Note. CCI = cultural and creative industry. Authors’ calculations from pooled United Kingdom’s Labour 
Force Survey Quarterly Data, 2013-2015. The third column gives the results of regressions identical to 
Column 3 of Table 5, for each individual CCI.
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qualification with employment trajectories. There are of course areas, from acting to 
museum curating, where formal training in a specific discipline is strongly linked to 
employment. But it is equally likely to be the case that a general humanities or social 
science degree, coupled with interest in consumption or personal practice, is what 
leads to a career in the cultural occupations. Similarly, as Table 6 shows, those with 
arts degrees work throughout the economy.
As Table 7 shows, while over half of those (56%) working in the United Kingdom, 
CCI occupations have a university degree, only 29% are arts graduates. Moreover, and 
most notably, in every CCI occupation apart from design, we do not find a statistically 
significant earnings return (based on conducting regressions of earnings for each CCI 
separately) for having studied an arts degree compared with not having been to univer-
sity at all.
The relatively weak link between credentials and employment therefore mean that 
arts education cannot perform the same equalizing function that it may do in other 
cases, because its impact on the labor market is simply less important.
Discussion and Conclusion
The closing comment of the previous paragraph gestures toward an uneasy conclusion 
for those seeking to hold onto meritocratic narratives of cultural work. Indeed, it sug-
gests that even higher education, which the literature on professions suggests might 
assist in mitigating the effects of social inequality, is insufficient to overcome the 
impact of class and geography on creative occupations. As our analysis shows, cultural 
labor markets are highly unequal. From our case study of the United Kingdom, we can 
see women, those from racial and ethnic minorities, and individuals from working-
class backgrounds are all underrepresented in professional employment, with notable 
skews in some of the more prestigious sectors. For example, in the cluster of occupa-
tions containing film and TV, less than 5% of the workforce is from an ethnic minority 
and less than 30% are women. There is also strong evidence that those from working-
class backgrounds are underrepresented across the board, again particularly in those 
sectors with the greatest symbolic capital and (arguably) the greatest influence, for 
example, film and TV or publishing. Such findings also support the major media and 
public debates over the struggles for cultural representation.
What has been less discussed, however, are the ways in which space and place, and 
particularly spatial inequality, plays into this story. There is a huge and long-standing 
literature, particularly within economic geography, on the location of cultural produc-
tion (Pratt, 2008), the dominance of particular urban centers (Scott, 2000) and on the 
way in which public policy has sought to develop the CCIs outside of these dominant 
areas (Lee, Hesmondhalgh, Oakley, & Nisbett, 2014). Behind much of this work is an 
implicit story about inequality—why some cities rather that others? Why is symbolic 
capital so vested in Paris, New York, or Milan, but not Montpelier, Dayton, or Catania? 
Can public policy change this dynamic and can, as Richard Florida and others have 
claimed, any place become a hotspot for the creative class? It is against this back-
ground that, as scholars who write about inequality, we sought to bring together work 
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on space and place and on labor markets and to examine the ways in which the cul-
tural, social, and economic current of this story reinforce one another.
In our case, the focus of attention was London, which as the article explains, domi-
nates British cultural, political, and economic life in ways which are extreme and 
unusual, though we believe that the findings do have implications for other, less cen-
tralized societies, where cultural and symbolic power is nonetheless vested in a small 
number of specific “cultural capitals.” Our findings suggest that there is a “London 
effect,” with those employed in London’s cultural sector more likely to come from 
privileged backgrounds than in the rest of the United Kingdom. Those in the cultural 
sectors in London earn more than in the rest of the United Kingdom, which is hardly 
surprising, but there is also a class-related pay gap; workers from lower socioeco-
nomic origins in the CCIs earn less on average in both London and the rest of the 
United Kingdom—a “class pay gap” across the aggregated CCI sector. But this class 
pay gap is larger in London, where those from working-class backgrounds earn on 
average only 85% of what those from higher professional and managerial backgrounds 
earn, whereas elsewhere in the United Kingdom, the same figure is 90%. As a reminder, 
our findings on earnings only apply to those who report earnings, not to the 12% of 
CCI workers who say they are self-employed, or the 33% of CCI workers who do not 
report earnings for other unknown reasons. That is an important limitation, however, 
this is the best available data on earnings in the CCIs, and while there may be other 
patterns for the people who do not report, we believe these patterns are an important 
basis for future research.
In other professional sectors, there is evidence that higher education substantially 
mitigates this class origin pay inequality. However, in the CCIs, the equalizing effect 
of higher education is significantly more modest. This may, of course, change over 
time, as the workforce, along with the rest of society, becomes more credentialized. 
We will, of course, need to return to this question over time. However, our current 
analysis has two important implications for arts graduates and their educators. The 
first is that the economic case for arts education must be rethought in the face of evi-
dence suggesting arts education is yet to deliver a secure, credentialized, route into the 
CCIs (see Martin & Frenette, IN PRESS, for more on unequal professional outcomes 
among U.S. arts graduates). The second lies in the defense of the art school and arts 
education. In our analysis of British data, the financial case for arts education, in terms 
of future earnings (and leaving aside exceptionally successful “stars”), is weak. Other 
nations’ artistic labor markets may have different dynamics protecting returns on arts 
education (e.g., Bille & Jensen, 2016 on Denmark) and it may be the case that arts 
education is providing valuable skills for other sectors of the economy and other forms 
of economic activity beyond CCIs (Bridgstock & Cunningham, 2016). Entrepreneurial 
activity is clearly part of that; the Strategic National Arts Alumni Project data suggest 
that some 16.1% of arts graduates in the United States claim to have founded a non-
profit or for-profit at some point in their working lives (Frenette & Tepper, 2016). The 
specific dynamics of British cultural labor markets, along with the destinations of 
artistic graduates, suggests that justifying these experiences in terms of social justice 
or in terms of broader economic impact, as has become de rigeur, is limited.
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The traditional narrative of the art school, and the sorts of defense offered by Frith 
and Horne (1987), drew on the importance of place in association with the values of 
the institution. As our analysis of the uneven geography of the creative labor force 
suggests, there is a need to return attention to spatial issues when considering cultural 
work. As it stands, the interventions to make towns and cities “creative” in the United 
Kingdom has not challenged London’s dominance of this section of the labor force. 
Nor has the creative ethos and the meritocracy of talent seemingly fostered by the arts 
degree overturned this settlement.
If we are to see society fairly reflected in its cultural workforce, then creative city 
policy must interact with broader issues of the uneven geography of the nation. 
Moreover, the assumption that any single policy intervention, whether urban, educa-
tional, or cultural, will untangle the Gordian knot of CCI inequality must be chal-
lenged. This challenge, as we have shown, requires the intersection of cultural, 
educational, industrial, and urban policy to address both the well-known inequalities 
of culture and the “London Effect” we have demonstrated. The challenge is steep, but 
the opportunities for cities and towns offered by a fairer, more diverse, cultural labor 
force served by an open and meritocratic education system, are rich goals worth 
pursuing.
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Notes
1. NS-SEC is a socioeconomic classification made up of seven analytic classes and similar in 
structure to the Erikson–Goldthorpe–Portacerero schema used in the United States.
2. We use Table 10 from http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/classifications/current-
standard-classifications/soc2010/soc2010-volume-3-ns-sec–rebased-on-soc2010–user-
manual/index.html at Office for National Statistics, the “simplified scheme” to match 
parents’ four-digit SOC2010 occupational codes to the analytic NS-SEC categorization.
3. The 221 cases with missing data were excluded via list-wise deletion, as recommended by 
Allison (2001). This approach is appropriate in regressions, unless there is a probability 
that the predictor variables in a model are missing because of the dependent variable; it 
seems unlikely that this is the case here.
4. If all class backgrounds were equally represented in each of these occupations then all the 
bars would be 1.
5. The similarity in earnings between London and nonurban areas is primarily due to the over-
representation of the highest earning sector of the CCIs, advertising, in nonurban areas, and 
the fact that those in advertising who work in nonurban areas have a similar average salary 
to their peers in London. Those in architecture in nonurban areas also earn more than those 
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in London. In all other sectors, earnings in London are substantially higher than in both 
other urban areas and in nonurban areas.
6. We have compared these differences between London and the rest of the United Kingdom 
with differences between London and other urban areas in the United Kingdom and found 
that the composition of the CCIs in London is very different from both other urban areas, 
nonurban areas throughout the country, and the rest of the country as a whole. See the 
appendix (available online at http://journals.sagepub.com/home/abs/) for more detail.
7. See the appendix for sources and distributions of all variables used in regressions. 
Coefficients for the quarter in which the respondent reported earnings are not shown in 
Table 5, but are available in the appendix as well.
8. It is worth noting here that this finding is driven by the impact of London, rather than the 
impact of working in any urban area. We have looked at whether this might be an urban/
not effect rather than a specifically London effect by including a three-category variable 
for London, other Urban, and the rest of the United Kingdom; people living in London earn 
£8,243 more (p < .001) on average than otherwise similar respondents living in other urban 
areas in the United Kingdom and working in the CCIs.
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